Look at What Might Have Been

In thinking about Iraq and what we can do now to move to a conclusion, I think it helps to look at what we might have done at different times since 2003 and at what the consequences might have been.
The first and most obviously consequential “might have been” is that we could have decided not to invade Iraq at all. Saddam Hussein would probably still be in power in Iraq - still anti-American, but still constrained by sanctions and inspectors and no-fly zones and still pumping oil, keeping a lid on the sectarian conflicts, and remaining a partial bulwark against Iran. Our armed forces would be fresh and largely uncommitted and – having been spared the strength-sapping grind of futile reconstruction duty in Iraq - both freer and more able to deal with real threats to our interests. Our economy would be better and stronger by the billions of dollars we did not spend in Iraq, and several thousand good Americans would be alive and healthy instead of dead or wounded. From a geopolitical perspective, it surely seems that this would have been the best choice for the United States. On the other side of the scales, a tyranny would remain in place in Iraq, and innocent Iraqis would continue to suffer under it. However, there is no real reason to believe that anything we are doing in the occupation and attempted reconstruction of Iraq will result in banishing tyranny from that country for long. Rather, there is every historical reason to believe that it will not. Beyond that, there are many brutal tyrannies in the world, and, while the behavior of tyrants in their own countries provides justification for the United States (or anyone else) to attack and depose them, it is usually not seen as providing a sufficient reason for doing so.
The next and less desirable possibility would have been to act as though the mission really were accomplished at about the time when President Bush declared it so on the aircraft carrier. The war was won. Hussein’s government had been deposed, and he was in hiding. The Iraqi armed forces were disarmed, effectively destroyed and unlikely to become a threat to anyone soon. Our enemies around the world had seen a terrible and swift demonstration of our power and our ability to deliver it where we desired. We could have created a useful provisional government, granted the Kurds local rule, punished people we wanted to punish, enforced a peace agreement giving us a couple of bases in Iraq for a hundred years, guaranteed the country against invasion from Iran, and announced that in a short while the bulk of our forces were going home. Long term reconstruction would have been left to the Iraqis themselves and perhaps the United Nations. Besides saving us most of the cost and futility of the last few years, this would have sent a truly frightening message to our enemies about our purposefulness and ruthlessness and, if done carefully, probably would have left Iraq in only a little worse shape that it is in now.
A final possibility, far from desirable, but still better that the present mess, would have been to jump into the reconstruction ruthlessly and without regard for political correctness or the sensibilities of Iraqi politicians. We could have defined a mission for ourselves that did not depend on or even really rely on those politicians or their government. We could have sealed the borders with Syria and Iran and threatened those countries into helping with the sealing. We could have been far more aggressive in destroying rebel strongholds and far less tolerant of obstruction from various clerics and sects. The reconstruction probably would not have outlasted our leaving by very long, but we would have been able to depart sooner without leaving powerful enemies behind us in Iraq and without being seen by our enemies elsewhere as such unserious people.
It seems that at almost every turning point in Iraq our government has taken steps that put us in a worse position and left us with a worse set of choices. I believe that we might need to invoke the first rule of holes and stop digging. Our best bet may be to declare the reconstruction a success, arrange appropriate long term concessions in Iraq, do something to convince our other enemies that - despite the evidence of the last four years - we are not fools or ditherers, and get out, hoping that we have learned something from the experience. There is not much I can see that recommends the strategy we have followed.