Repeating Blunders in Iraq

It is surely good to hear news from Iraq that suggests that we are making progress and may be nearer to a time when we can leave the place without appearing to have been defeated. However the fact that we may be able to recover from our blunders and save the situation does not make them any less blunders. We have to look at the mess in Iraq and try to learn from it.
The first lesson to learn - or remember – is that national interests should determine grand strategy which should determine specific objectives. While this seems trivially obvious, our government has managed to have forgotten it for several years in Iraq. Our basic national interests in the Middle East are in reducing the likelihood of major attacks by terrorists, keeping the oil flowing, and preventing hostile governments from becoming too powerful. A reasonable and simple strategy in the region would be to defeat terrorists and punish governments that support them, suppress conflicts that would close the sea lanes or the pipelines, and take appropriate action against governments that become threatening. In the light of those interests and that strategy (and knowing only what was known in 2002 and early 2003), it is possible to make a case for invading Iraq in 2003 with the objectives of disarming its forces, deposing its dictator, and securing its oil fields. There is of course a very strong argument that no invasion was necessary, but an invasion with only those objectives at least would have had a strategic rationale.
An operation with those objectives would have ended in victory not very long after our forces entered Baghdad. The mission really would have been accomplished, and accomplished remarkably well. However, instead of stopping where sound strategy would dictate, we embarked on a new operation to build a nation and make sure the Iraqis learn how to behave just like the Republicans and the Democrats. That mission has not been accomplished. After three years we are still there, still paying billions, still taking casualties, and not seeing any strategic payoff for it.
That brings us to the second lesson. We should never forget Vietnam. The war in Vietnam was a disastrous failure for our nation that had lasting and well known consequences. Knowing that, one might expect our leaders to have learned from the mistakes made in Vietnam and to never repeat them. But that was not the case. Instead our government repeated many of the worst mistakes of Vietnam.
Just as in Vietnam, we made our success dependent on the success of a shaky and incompetent local government. Just as in Vietnam, we tied our plan for successful disengagement to the performance of inept and ineffective local troops. Just as in Vietnam, we took the world’s finest combat soldiers and turned them into often hated foreign policemen and then wondered why their discipline and morale suffered. Just as in Vietnam, we refrained for political reasons from bringing full and adequate power to bear against the enemy. Just as in Vietnam, we micromanaged the action in the field from Washington and imposed restrictive and often hamstringing rules on our forces. Just as in Vietnam, we often allowed our enemies’ safe havens in hostile neighboring countries and tolerated the flow of guerillas across porous borders. Finally, just as in Vietnam, we failed to make a cogent argument about what we were trying to accomplish or why it mattered or was worth the cost. It seems now that the only compelling reason for staying in Iraq is that we are there and that we cannot afford to leave looking like we have been beaten.
We must hope that this conflict ends better than the one in Vietnam did. We also must insist that our government learn from this and not botch the next one